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MISSION STATEMENT OF *THE APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGIST*

The Applied Anthropologist publishes peer-reviewed articles, commentaries, brief communications, field reports, and book reviews on a wide range of topics. The journal's focus is on cultural change and adaptation in the modern world. It explores how humans approach, analyze, and develop solutions to cultural, ecological, economic, and technological problems. The journal is supported and underwritten by the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology. Guidelines for authors, electronic access to back issues, and further information about the society is available on the website at www.HPSfAA.org.

POINT-TO-POINT
Ed Knop

Larry Van Horn: With Respect, Appreciation and Gratitude

In the forty-two years of the HPSfAA's existence we have enjoyed the companionship and contributions of many colleagues and friends only to be saddened too soon by their eternal passing on. We now add another special association pioneer, leader and friend to the list. Lawrence F. (Larry) Van Horn left us this October 12th. Among other contributions, Larry was a champion of The Applied Anthropologist (TAA), serving two separate terms as Editor In Chief in the journal's earlier history, and as innovative Book Review Editor before and following his general editorship service. Among other professional service awards, he earned the HPSfAA 2007 Omer Stewart Award for distinguished professional service. And he was for many years an enjoyable, stimulating participant and sometimes presenter in many of our association's meetings.

Larry's career job was with the National Park Service, where he served as a Cultural Resource Anthropologist in the Resource Planning Division, Denver Service Center. This involved his applied research and application service in the mutual interest of both subjects and agency. His Graduate School education through the PhD was at the City University of New York with a specialization in North American Indian Cultures with fieldwork in Canada and the U.S.

Larry was active in several anthropology and government-related organizations, frequently participating in panels, programs and public presentations. Throughout his career he contributed a range of technical reports, journal articles and symposium chapters, often touching on sensitive cultural issues and field methods involved in Native American relations with governmental operations and authority. Several of his articles appeared in TAA, as did many of his book reviews and commentaries (uniquely, he favored both comparative reviews of several books on a given topic in a single review essay, and several separate reviews of one book side by side). Among his TAA publications is his Omer Stewart Award receipt presentation, "Three Rules of Straight Talk," in which he displays some his core life philosophy: be accurate, be basic (down to earth), be brief, be relevant to your audience and situation (TAA, Vol. 28, No. 1 Spring, 2008, pp 144-146).

As a colleague and friend, Larry was a delightful experience (in the words of one mutual friend, "an experience for sure, one that grows on you in a good way"). In this present "straight talk," he had a kind, gentle, creatively stimulating, sometimes playfully gruff nature that made him an interesting pleasure to share conversations and project tasks with. At times he chose to be reasonably private, working more independently for efficiency or some other reason. In his work as researcher, author and editor, he was a stickler for getting details right and keeping on focus, holding himself and others to high standards. Had this not been the case, he perhaps would have published more, probably not of quality that his publications did show, and he certainly made up for written communication impacts with his generous consultation, session presentation and informal verbal inputs.

In sum--as with so many other former respected HPSfAA colleagues and friends--those among us fortunate enough to have spent time with Larry over the years do cherish our shared experiences with much respect, appreciation and gratitude for his colleagueship, competence, caring and contributions. Thanks, Larry, for your serious service and pleasant social playfulness--also to that of other similar departed friends who have walked our road with us. And to those of us who will.

POEM:
IN YOUR PRESENCE
after Martin Buber

HOWARD F. STEIN

You! Scrawny scrub oak,
Blackjack, post oak,
You! I address You –
My nearest neighbors,
Your tenacious woods surround me;
You claw deep with your thirsty roots
To reach fickle rain.

You were here before
These houses were built,
My yard, your forest.
I cannot think of you as property –
Do you belong to me,
Or do I belong to you?

Most people call you
Scourge to sight,
Prince of disfigurement.
You have no place
In the company
Of redwood and red maple.
What use are you
But to chop and burn?

Still . . . I call you kin;
I call you by name,
Who, my who, not *what*.
You give me life.
When I touch you,
You touch back;
I run my fingers along
Your craggy bark.
I know someone is in there.
Your coarse skin
Shields your vulnerable
Interior, where precious
Nutrient flows to leaf and root.

You and your kin
Nourish me, too,
As I sit among you
On my front porch,
Drift into sleep
In the reverie of your shade.

Am I mad to think of you
As a person-tree,
Just as I am
A person-mammal?

You! despised oak,
Insignificant oak,
You are my company,
My companion,
My friend.

Howard F. Stein, Ph.D., is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center in Oklahoma City. The author of many books and articles, several published in *The Applied Anthropologist*, Howard is also a High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology board member. He can be reached at howard-stein@ouhsc.edu.

FEATURED ARTICLE:

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE VIET NAM WAR: PERSPEC-
TIVES FROM A SOLDIER TURNED ANTHROPOLOGIST

GERALD WAITE

ABSTRACT

Refugees, their movements, and the problems associated with their survival and maintenance in combat scenerios were a constant element of the American War in Việt Nam. Traditional Vietnamese village structure with its communal character created the perfect situation for revolutionary movements and their ensuing conflicts. These same villages then became targets for search and destroy operations and later wholesale clearing operations in which entire populations were forced into resettlement. This is a case study of the movement of a population from a kin-structured, land- and reciprocity-based enclave, to a resettlement hamlet. No longer sheltered from the larger world, these hamlets represent forced assimilation into an expanding world economy.

KEY WORDS: Việt Nam, American War in Việt Nam, Quảng Nam Province, refugees

Introduction

The Vietnamese wars of the last century, especially the French and American, can be more fully understood as the inevitable collision of economic systems and the corresponding evolution of revolutionary paradigms. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century and continuing to this day, economic systems have been manipulated and changed by an ever-expanding elite and market-economy. Authors such as James Scott, and Eric Wolf look at the broad scope of peasant revolution in Asian societies and suggest that moral based revolts of the peasantry of the world are the inevitable outcome of resistance to the forces of globalization (1976:207-240, 1969:204-207). In "The Great Transformation" Karl Polanyi claims market expansion and the organization of production in the development of the "self regulating market" produces great evils and if left unchecked would be detrimental to human society (1944:130-131). He goes on to argue that primitive subsistence societies are organized in ways that do not permit hunger and as such are more humane than more advanced societies and that the only means to assimilate people from these groups into the market economy is through starvation (1944:164-165). Polanyi also refers to counter-movements which he terms as "interventionism" or forces that checked the action of the free-market "in respect to the factors of production, labor and land"(1944:131). These counter-movements surfaced in Southeast Asia in the form of rebellions centered around colonialism and its creation of peasant subsistence crisis.

The colonial state with its ever increasing demands upon the peasantry; the transfer of traditional communal-use lands from village to state, with the loss of the subsistence use of those lands; the rise of a landlord class as opposed to the earlier "patron" model; and the increased emphasis on the cash economy in every sector of peasant life, effectively demolished the reciprocity based nature of the Vietnamese village and created the moral outrage necessary for revolution (Scott 1976)[i]. These conditions coupled with an insider/outsider consciousness on the part of the peasantry and the rise of nationalism at a state level, fueled cooperative rebellion against the French colonials, and then their replacements, the Americans.

James Trullinger estimated that as many as 80% of the population Mỹ Thủy Phương, a village lying just South of Hue the ancient Imperial capital, supported the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong (VC) (1980:113). As soldiers in Việt Nam we were told of American military estimates ranging from 75% to 90% loyalty to the Government of South Việt Nam (GVN)[ii]. Near urban Villages with their proximity to larger population bases such as Saigon, Hue, or Đà Nẵng were more likely to be considered as friendly to the GVN and suffered much less long-term damage to their traditional infrastructure. Trullinger's study of Mỹ Thủy Phương and Schell's of a village named Bến Súc, about 30 miles from Saigon[iii], show the opposite extremes of village survival (1980, 1968). Mỹ Thủy Phương survived the war intact even though it had a deep allegiance to the revolutionary front and few ties to the central government probably because it was close to Hue, and on a railroad and Highway 1, the only fully operational highway during most of the conflict (Trullinger 1980). The village Bến Súc, on the other hand, was completely destroyed and its inhabitants all moved or detained because it was primarily rural and seen as uncontrollable. To use Jonathon Schell's own words: "As though, having once decided to destroy it, we were now bent on annihilating every possible indication that the village of Bến Súc ever existed" (1968:132). One of my own observations from the war was that those villages that were close to Highway 1 survived almost unscathed, while those removed even a short distance from the highway could be termed a no-man's land and a free-fire zone. What follows is an account of one of these villages.

Time and Place

Việt Nam was divided into four sectors of military control during the American War. The Northern-most sector was that from Quảng Trị, or at the demilitarized zone, south to a town called Tam Kỳ. This area was designated "I Corps" and included the Imperial Capital Huế, and the autonomous city of Đà Nẵng. During the year of 1970 I was a first lieutenant assigned to the 29th Civil Affairs Company in Đà Nẵng. Civil Affairs or CA. CA is that branch of the Army which deals with the problems associated with civilians in military areas of operations. Every military unit of battalion size or larger size has a S5 or G5 office charged with the responsibility of managing civilians and assisting with problems of civil control and subsistence in military operations. The 29th Civil Affairs Company had the responsibility of providing CA trained officers and enlisted men to all the operational (infantry) units in I Corps. As such, I was subsequently assigned to the First Marine Division G5 Office at Freedom Hill near Đà Nẵng. During that time, I was assigned to a variety of projects in the 1st Marine Area of Operations (AO) often, as an advisor to various units in the field. Most of my duties pertained to the movement of refugees and their medical and subsistence needs. Beginning in June of 1970, I was assigned to a project entitled the Gò Nỗi Island Resettlement in

which 1st Marine division wanted to move several thousand refugees from various camps in their AO to a previously occupied inland island called Phu Ky or Gò Nỗi.

Phú Lộc village, Gò Nỗi Island. July 1970. Note the strategic construction, defensible and easy to see who might be coming and going. The government claimed 2200 people lived there. Most days it was more like 800 women and children.

Gò Nỗi Island totals about 2500 hectares completely surrounded by rivers, 25 kilometers south of the City of Đà Nẵng, approximately in the middle of Quảng Nam Province. Prior to 1965 it was one of the richest areas in the central part of Việt Nam. Primary sources of income came from raw silk production and rice agriculture (Waite September, 1970). Between 1965 and 1968, Gò Nỗi was an area hostile to the GVN and American forces in Việt Nam. Marines in Quảng Nam Province nicknamed it "Dodge City", an indication of its reputation as a place of increasingly more firefights and casualties (Gregg and Waite 1970)[iv]. The island lies in Điện Bàn District, which was labeled as the most contested area of I Corps (Hunt 1995:176). The first major operation against the VC infrastructure Operation Meade River, took place in November 1968 as part of an Accelerated Pacification Program. This operation manned with Marines, soldiers from the Army of the Republic of Việt Nam (ARVN), and National Police, cordoned the area, interrogated the residents, and detained those who were deemed possible guerillas. The rest were allowed to go home. The operation did not succeed in actually securing the area however, and by June of 1969, several major US Marine operations were directed at Gò Nỗi with the aim of depriving the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) of its use. These multiple operations mounted against the fortified villages of the island had little effect upon the deteriorating security situation there. (Hunt 1995:175-177).

Gò Nỗi is actually quite close to Highway 1 and just a few kilometers from the provincial capital of that time, Hội An. It was connected to the surrounding land areas by two railroad bridges through the approximate center of the island and a bridge, called "Liberty Bridge" by the Marines, at the west end of the island which connected to a village called An Hoa and the Marine firebase located nearby. Highway 1 passed about one kilometer from the eastern-most tip of the island, and the easiest access from there was by canoe or sanpan. Even though access sounds easy, it was not, and the island was remote and deeply rural, as it still is today. One Marine who was involved in an operation "Pipestone Canyon" on the island said they were told it was an R&R (rest and relaxation) center for the NVA and VC. That operation did find regular units of the NVA on the island and encountered

stiff resistance from those units as well as the VC. The tactical situation of Quảng Nam Province in 1969 required that such a large-scale staging area for revolutionary forces be dealt with, so, the enemy should be deprived of the use of that real-estate. Gò Nỗi as less than 5 kilometers from the District Headquarters of Điện Bàn, about the same distance from the provincial capital Hội An and the 5th Marines Headquarters at An Hòa, 12 km from 7th Marines at Fire Base Ross near Quế Sơn, and within 122 mm rocket range of the large US airfield at Đà Nẵng. This proximity allowed the VC and NVA almost unlimited access to those targets. The island had a pre-1965 population of about 17,500 people in 12 or more villages spread out over the island. These villages were then further dispersed into hamlets ranging in size from a few houses to a few dozen houses (http://www. marzone. com/maps/Map_6640.htm)[v]. Many of the people I talked to who had originally come from the island said that people there were quite prosperous and well established with many brick and masonry homes. Even though I was never physically on the island before it was cleared, the brick and mortar fragments left from the bombing would seem to bear this out.

In June 1969, the GVN and allied forces of Quảng Nam Province decided to clear the population from Gò Nỗi and render the island useless to the opposition forces. Leaflet drops were conducted informing the people that the area would be bombed and that they should leave. By July 1969, Gò Nỗi was cleared of its original inhabitants (personal communication, 2002, anon). Artillery shelling and bombings, including many B-52 missions, reduced the island to dust.

Resettlement

In April 1970, I Corps command and the GVN created a return to village project on Gò Nỗi Island as a joint venture. First Marine Division was tasked with road building, engineer support, and civil affairs assistance for the project. I went to live on the island June 17, 1970, as the civil affairs officer. The First Marine Division had assigned a Marine engineer officer to the project, and the province chief had assigned a South Vietnamese captain as the officer in charge of the project. There was also a civilian from the U.S. Agency for International Development and its subsidiary Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) (Fritz 2003). Initial plans called for the resettlement of 17,000 refugees on the island. This was approximately the same number of people dislocated from that area and spread out in various refugee camps in Quảng Nam Province.

Several facts became clear early on in this project that set the stage for later developments. Even though the GVN numbers were large on paper the refugees that were allowed back on the island were actually small in number. The first hamlet, name Phú Lộc, at the Eastern-most point of the island was the only real focus of the project and could accommodate no more than 2200 people at best. It may have achieved a population that large at some time during the project; however, most of my counts reflect a population of between 800-1000 (Gregg and Waite 1970). Even though the GVN initiated the project, most of the materials and resources utilized were from the First Marine Division and CORDS. The people who were moved back to the island had absolutely no resources, no money, no food, no implements, no seed, and little hope. Individuals were randomly picked from the refugee camps without regard to family affiliation or hamlet of origin, loaded in trucks and dumped in the area of Phú Lộc. There was a Village Chief, appointed by the District Chief at Điện Bàn. In my dealings with him, even though friendly, he seemed to have no influence over anything connected with the village. Another villager told me that he was a well-to-do farmer from another village near Điện Bàn who had no connection to Phú Lộc other than a political appointment from the

District Chief. He was assassinated later that same year. Most of the people in Phú Lộc early on seemed to have little connection to the island. I tried to get people to help me mark pre-war gravesites so that I could plot roads around them, but no-one knew of any. I found several on my own as I mapped for roads and access to the village and assumed at that time that the people of Phú Lộc came from a different part of the island. Additionally, some of the areas around the graves were mined and we suffered some casualties trying to locate and move them.

The need for security surpassed all other requirements in the construction of hamlets. Rather than the traditional hamlet structure spread out in the fields, Phú Lộc and later, a second village named Phú Phong, were arranged in on straight-line rows of houses that permitted open shooting lanes (fields of fire) between houses, straight line boundaries also allowed easy visual access to the comings and goings of people in the hamlet, and to the large expanses surrounding the hamlet cleared of any vegetation. The settlements took on the appearance of the "Strategic Hamlets" of the Diem/Nhu era of the late 1950s (Hunt 1995:21). These become fortified hamlets of a different nature than the earlier island villages. The fortified villages before the island was cleared included bunkers to protect the inhabitants against air and artillery attack. Many houses had bunkers for the household and for the animals. Later many of these houses were connected to tunnels that were used by the revolutionary front. Carl Fritz notes in his online article about Gò Nỗi that these tunnels were actually lined with American cement (Fritz 2003). I did not know about these at all but kids on the island in 2004 showed me the caved in remains of tunnels, even including one that was under a house that I spent a good deal of time during the war. After the return, the villagers had bunkers as part of their houses, but the village was considered fortified in that it had concertina wire around it, trip flares and claymores in an outer perimeter, cleared fields of fire in every direction, and a heavily armed security contingent highly visible at all times.

This was the era known as Pacification for which the principle metaphor was "winning the hearts and minds"(see Hunt 1995 and Fritz 2003). However, this metaphor was challenged by the number of people carrying weapons. Phú Lộc had security provided by a U.S. Army Military Advisory Team (MAT) of 6 men and an accompanying Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) company of over 100, a Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) of 7 with a People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) of 40 or so armed teenagers, a detached Korean Marine company of 200, and various military types like myself, the Marine engineer, and the South Vietnamese project officer. Many times in the 5 months I lived on the island there were more people carrying guns than hoes. In his foreign service reminiscences, Fritz states that "one night the VC came… old men, women, and children, armed with shotguns and grenades, met them at the perimeter of the hamlet and drove them off" (Fritz 2003). Anyone who ever lived in these villages knows that old men, women, and children weren't armed with anything other than an occasional pitchfork that hadn't been taken from them. On the night in question, the regular military forces actually did most of the fighting, the Vietnamese captain got wounded, med-evaced, and never came back to the island, The teenage PSDF with their Thompson sub-machine guns and other World War II arms disappeared in the night.

Clearing the island for habitation was actually a bigger job than we first expected. The entire ground surface was pockmarked with thousands of bomb craters. There was unexploded ordinance everywhere, which had to be cleared before bulldozers could be used. Even though ground was eventually cleared and leveled for growing, very few people had the resources to plant anything, and to this day I am not sure that the government ever redistributed any land to the people

who moved to the island. I believe it may have stayed in the hands of the District Chief of Điện Bàn or some of his friends. First Marine Division donated irrigation pumps to the village, but no one tried planting any rice in the first year during which time the pumps disappeared.

Phú Phong Village, Late July 1970. This village was destroyed by an American helicopter squadron six months later.

The second village of Phú Phong was started on the 10th of July 2 km west of the first village, but no land was cleared other than for the village proper. No more than a hundred people ever tried to live there. Security was not as good as the first village and the CORDS project officer was killed by a landmine in August, a death which effectively terminated most of the building efforts[vi].   An announced visit by South Vietnamese President Thieu to Phú Lộc focused most of the attention on that village at the expense of Phu Phong. During the month prior to that visit roads were surfaced, a school was built, flag poles erected, wells dug, and some fields were planted in vegetable crops although August was not a good month for planting anything. Funds were allocated to purchase books for the school and it was in use during Thieu's visit but shortly thereafter it became a storage building for the District Chief's rice. I counted 1838 people living on the island during Thieu's visit but never saw that many people after that time (Gregg and Waite 1970).

In late 1970, the hamlet of Phú Lộc became a model for everyone who wanted to construct resettlement hamlets. During the project and after the initial phase, which ended in October, the project had daily helicopter visits from dignitaries and high-ranking military officers from all the services. The only missing notable was the District chief of Điện Bàn, and we assumed he wanted to avoid us so that he didn't have to sign the requisition for the 5 gallons of petrol he allowed the project each day. The positive side of this was that materials were readily obtainable just for the asking during the early stages of the project. The down side was that we spent far more time escorting dignitaries around our "human zoo" as we called it, than we did doing real work.

No one at the site or in the government really put much thought into how people were going to live or where food would come from. The Marines donated ship dunnage from the harbor in Đà Nẵng and a marine engineer sawmill. We used the sawmill to cut lumber for the housing and sold it for 2500 Vn. or about $21.50 American for enough lumber to build a one room house. Since none of the villagers had any money we set up village work crews with Marine and Province supplied funds where people could work enough to get food and get the money to buy a house kit. People worked in the sawmill, and the only non-Viet was a Marine who operated the saw itself. People worked in the vil-

lage, helping construct houses and digging wells. Much of the heavy work such as the construction of a "non-standard bridge", roadways, and field clearing were done by the Marines (Gregg and Waite 1970). As a civil affairs officer, I set up an unexploded ordinance disposal program with money given by the Marines. I employed children of all ages to find unexploded bombs and ordinance (UXO) which were then blown up in place. The kids were paid piece rate with higher prices paid for larger bulldozer damaging bombs. This in turn generated another source of income for many of the families in the hamlet and often some food too. On days when we had some C-4 (plastic explosive) left I would use it to stun fish in the small ponds created by craters thus giving the kids some protein to take home.

Aftermath

Gò Nỗi Island was in many ways a model for resettlement. It was one of the first to move a large number of people from refugee camps back to the land. It created home ownership once again for people who had been deprived of their homes, and it created some land usage if not land ownership. The people who wound up living in Phú Lộc still have family there and at this point have land tenure. Phú Phong was not successful, in part because of its distance from the roads and because it did not get the flow of resources the first hamlet did. It does exist now, under a different name, although I don't know the specific history of its rebirth. American forces departed Quảng Nam in 1972 and with that, Gò Nỗi was once again out of sight and out of mind.

The author with "bombfinder" kids, Phú Lộc Village, June 1970. They found and destroyed 2500 pieces of unexploded ordnance in the first month of this project.

Both hamlets lie in a flood plain, which has worsened in recent years because of environmental degradation from the defoliants during the war years. One of the noticeable changes at this time is that Phú Lộc (renamed Ap Troung) has assumed a shape more like that of the older pre-1965 hamlet. The marine sawmill is still there but rusted solid from repeated soakings in the river. Many of the hamlet's dwellings are built up at higher than ground level, and some of the lower concrete structures

show water lines from previous floods. Several houses have boats tied to them. Việt Nam has a large number of very broad short rivers that drain from the mountains the 20 or 30 kilometers to the South China Sea. The Điện Binh River on the north side of Gò Nỗi was one - a km wide and relatively deep in 1970. Now it is 2-3 km wide and shallow, with, average depth of 1 meter, but can rise 3-4 meters overnight. This floods all the low-lying areas like major parts of Gò Nỗi , often with loss of crops and sometimes loss of life. The Marine bridge that was constructed in 1970 was washed out in 1997, and a new bridge opened in 2002. During the intervening years access to the island was by ferry or walking the two railroad bridges. A cursory inspection of the island and subsistence shows very little rice agriculture and much reliance on melons, peppers, vegetables, and tea (all cash crops). This would indicate a move away from subsistence agriculture to and an increased participation in the market economy through the production of cash crops. The island was electrified in about 2006 and there is an abundance of material goods such as radios, walkmans, mopeds, and bicycles.

Conclusions

The Gò Nỗi Island resettlement project could indeed be called a success, not because it managed to put people's lives back together but because in fact it did not. Traditional economies in peasant societies, especially in Southeast Asia, are reciprocal economies with safety mechanisms built in to ensure survival of the group. The cash economy and market-based insecurities directly oppose peasant values of risk management and risk sharing, the basis for the traditional village structure (Scott 1976:57). Revolution occurs when the traditional values are breached in such a way as to continually threaten subsistence. The colonial government of Việt Nam did just that. The depth and breadth of that revolution is little understood by Americans even those involved in it. They failed to understand that the revolution grew out of the peasantry itself not out for the upper classes or communist agitators. This concept alone may have been one of the important factors in the outcome of the war. We went to Việt Nam secure in our belief that Ho Chi Minh was the sole cause of the revolution and that once the North was defeated all of the South would be willing subjects of an Americanized occupation and its capitalism. The idea that revolution could come from the peasant class and that the nationalism of the ruling class was in fact just a kind of glue that held things together, was beyond our understanding and consequently led in large part to our failure. Americans sized things up using the rhetoric of democracy, free market, trade and most importantly security, never realizing that the most essential question for a people was never asked: What did they need and how were those needs met previously? People like Colonel Corson in Mary McCarthy's "Việt Nam " looked at the peasant as someone who needs enough money to survive. To him (Corson) "the profit motive is the sole incentive capable of spurring anyone to productive effort" (McCarthy 1967:78). The idea of profit motive is the paradigm on which American capitalism is built and embedded in the creed of many Americans, However, it is antithetical to a peasant's worldview.

Peasant economies and their accompanying mechanisms are deeply rooted to the land. The first order of business in the introduction of a market economy is separating village inhabitants from their native environs. No one closely involved in the war effort really understood what we were doing, but it couldn't have been done better if we had deliberately planned it. The search and destroy operations and the refugee movements of the war effectively denied the VC and NVA the use of real estate and just as effectively denied most of Việt Nam's rural peasantry the same. Polanyi writes that separating man from the land is the first requirement of the market economy, and that in "modern colonization…the social and cultural system of the native must first be shattered" (1944:178). Americans repeated the 19th century process that

had proven successful with Native American populations and then in our American colonies post-World War I. Removal and resettlement to secured areas hence, refugee camps and resettlement hamlets, was deemed the answer to an uncontrollable security situation. However, enhanced security and pacified hamlets were not the only outcome.

Once peasants were removed from the land, many of the mechanisms that supported their reciprocal social organization were weakened bu. The patrons and landlords were gone, no one in the camps had more wealth than anyone else, and land ownership is a liability if it can't be farmed. Kin structure still existed, but with resources being scarce in the camps, reciprocity was reduced. The final blow to peasant order came in the form of an indiscriminate scattering of people back to the land. Kin were separated and traditional neighborhoods no longer existed. The nuclear family was often dismantled as well because the men were detained as potential guerillas or drafted into the GVN armed forces. People in resettlement hamlets were a mix of people from all over and more strangers to each other than those in any American sub-division. This further drove villages into the market economy. Without the protective mechanisms of the original village and the reciprocity structures therein, survival was dependant on the individual's ability to find a way to support him/herself and whatever family, in what was becoming a cash economy.

Main Street, Phú Lộc Village, Gò Nỗi Island, July 1970.

The structural layout of the village was also urban and foreign. Even in resettlement, people were still separated from the land they had once lived on. The traditional layout in the area of Phú Lộc was an elongated cluster of houses following a footpath north to south in close proximity to individual landholdings. The resettlement hamlet was laid out with security in mind, and the cleared zone around the hamlet put vegetable gardens and other land-based enterprise about 0.5 km from the people who might have worked the land. Because of this, people were reluctant to start gardens and plant rice.

Removal and resettlement may limit revolt and force peasant assimilation into the larger, world economy. Scott calls this "passive adaptation" (1976:205). Strategic hamlets and resettlement projects only intended to address the social disorder inherent in this transition. The idea of separating peasants from the land, limiting their connection to it, and the resulting assimilation into the capitalist system, came as an unintended consequence of policies intended to provide security and so ensure military victory.

The anthropological perspective here is in fact a retrospective analysis of a war-directed event of 52 years ago.[vii] This might be seen

by some as historical reminiscing or simply war stories as told by a former soldier. However, there is value in the critical view created in applying a different focus to events that seemed mono-chromatic in the need for a security-oriented outcome. With more than 50 million people on the road in the world today, complex understandings created through the lens of applied anthropology could contribute greatly to some resolution of these problems.

[i] *James Scott coined the phrase "Moral Economy of the Peasant" in his book of the same title. However, other authors such Gerald Cannon Hickey (1993) and Jonathon Schell (1968) address the ideas of exploitation and their results in the Việt Nam experience.*

[ii] *Figures for loyalty to the GVN and American cause were very high. "Tour 365" was the name of an American military produced tour book for servicemen like myself and their families that stated 95%. The figures given were obviously optimistic but none of us dared to think they could be that terribly inaccurate.*

[iii] *Sài Gòn was the name of the capitol of South Việt Nam. It is now known as Hồ Chí Minh City.*

[iv] *I am the sole author of the Gò Nỗi After-Action Report. It is, however, signed by my commanding officer Werner Gregg so references to it will include his name.*

[v] *These are my recollections coupled with 1965 maps available on the internet.*

[vi] *My own brother-in-law, an Army pilot, told me that his squadron had destroyed the second village 6 months after I left Việt Nam because he had taken fire from it when flying over.*

[vii] *The purpose of this paper is not to criticize or point out shortcomings of the various groups involved but it is impossible to tell the story without running into the inept comedy on the part of all of us who were involved in these projects.*

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FEATURED ARTICLE:
RHETORIC, RESPONSIBILITY AND CHANGE IN A STATE'S CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES

JAMES M. NYCE, GAIL BADER, NOEL HENGELBROK, AND SCOTT J. MODELL

ABSTRACT

The interventions introduced and described in this paper have emerged as a counterpoint to more orthodox safety science approaches (rule adherence and compliance). This study of two state human services focuses on the practitioners' rhetoric about culpability, in particular that gained from a critical analysis of work events (accidents) framed as first and second stories. As such, this research reports on an area that applied anthropology has seldom focused on. It draws upon symbolic interactionism as an actor-centered methodology so as to better appreciate the meanings and interpretations given work activities. The knowledge thus gained goes beyond the orthodox framing of safety interventions and acknowledges the influence of authority, hierarchy and power.

KEY WORDS: child welfare, organizational hierarchies, narratives and storytelling, professional work, safety and accidents, symbolic interactionism

Introduction

Eric Dean, 4, died February 28, 2013 in Pope County, Minnesota, despite many attempts by child protection workers to protect him. Widely publicized, Eric's death led to investigations into the state's child protective service (CPS) system. One of these, the Governor's Task Force on the Protection of Children, concluded its work March 23, 2015 with 93 recommendations for revamping the state's child protective service system.

What lay behind these administrative steps are the reverberations and recriminations that occurred after Eric's death at the various state and county agencies that make up Minnesota's child protection services. The turn-over rate at these agencies increased. Front line workers, managers, and supervisors functioned in fear and worked in what they called a "climate of blame." In Minnesota, childcare organizations outside state and local government focused on blame, identifying culpability and drafting new policy. But mainly, staff worried, who would be the next person accused of "causing" Eric's death? Or another death or serious injury? At that point in time, both inside and outside the child welfare community, was the feeling that someone, one person or more, had failed at their job and that failure caused Eric's death. These events led to the employment of the Collaborative Safety, LLC (hereafter, CS LLC), an outside consultancy, by the state of Minnesota. The CS LLC model attempts to apply the principles of safety science in Minnesota to improve child welfare in Minnesota.

Of particular interest to us here is the on-going creation of accountability and hierarchy in the workplace. These social relationships are neither fixed in context or in their relationship to each other. This is particularly true in the development of the CPS community's "climate of blame." CS LLC brought in new ways or staff to think about these issues in an attempt to provide more safety for the state's clients and staff.

With Eric's death these agencies were dealing with a problem not unknown in care work (i.e., social work more generally) or U.S. culture(s): the tendency to attribute failure and blame to individual actions when things go wrong. While social work is very bureaucratic, it is also largely based on face-to-face relationships. The approach we are taking here is based on the social construction of meaning as it shapes the actor's view. We are interested in how American values and understandings like responsibility, hierarchy and individualism are worked out when "failure" and blame are being assigned at work. Our starting point is that social agencies can be likened to social arenas where central issues like these are debated and redefined.

It is not surprising that these dilemmas would emerge in the US where individualism is so central to people's perception of themselves and their work. What the CS LLC consultants brought to this agency is a new model from the field of safety science and a specific set of activities that introduced its version of science and system to the workplace. Safety is a key concern in social work and it is not surprising then that the CS LLC rhetoric of safety was well received. This paper will argue that CS LLC hoped that its approach and these activities would allow staff to shift away from the notion that the actor's choice is the primary source of responsibility for failures. Further it was hoped that actors would come to understand the role that system and process can play in success or failure at work. As a result, safety science hoped to introduce a more objective way to identify the role of system in understanding failures and to provide more dependable data (i.e., science). This in turn, it was hoped, would help staff members see workplace relationships as something safety science could help them better understand.

Theory

The study of staff and workplace organizations has long focused on the notion of workplace culture involving roles, values and norms. As Susan Wright (1998) and other anthropologists have long been arguing the problem with most of these approaches is that they fail to focus analytically on the often changing, shifting nature of work and the workplace. Anthropologists, working in a comparative discipline, have long been aware of the relativity of context and knowledge. Berger and Luckmann have argued that whatever passes for "knowledge" and "reality" in everyday life varies from society to society.

> What is 'real' to a Tibetan Monk may not be 'real' to an American businessman. The 'knowledge' of the criminal differs from the 'knowledge' of the criminologist (Berger and Luckmann 1966:3).

To focus on the constructed nature of experience is to focus on the relation of knowledge and reality to specific social contexts (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This focus on the constructed nature of the workplace has also turned attention to the individual's role as an agent in these constructions. This research represents one strand of

constructionism. The constructionist position we take here focuses on language and rhetoric in the informants' understanding of their workplace(s).

A. Irving Hallowell, among others, has urged anthropologists to reject a "culture pattern" orientation toward social life and instead look at how individuals experience social life (Hallowell 1955:77). He argues the "objective" environment and what he terms the "culturally constituted behavioral environment" are not necessarily the same thing (Hallowell 1955:87). He therefore suggests that anthropologists should reject approaches which do not take account of the "significant and meaningful aspects of the world as experienced by him and in terms of which he thinks, is motivated to act, and satisfies his needs" (Hallowell 1955:88).

This line of thought has profoundly influenced the study of social life and the study of organizations. With it, the actor and agency have been brought into focus. Any adequate analysis must now include not only the description of social contexts but also the roles people play in the formation and maintenance of these contexts. The notion of context and its relation to the constitution of knowledge have challenged traditional divisions between the subjective and the objective. Analysis can now focus on the study of the assumptions and definitions that underlie social life and interaction. Within any bureaucratic setting, both staff and the anthropologists are still answering the same basic question posed by the symbolic interactionists: "What's going on here?" (Goffman 1974:8)

This approach takes seriously the role of language and rhetoric in the construction of context via social interaction. Michael Carrithers (2005) argues that the study of language and rhetoric can help us understand change in the workplace:

> "…a dynamism in social life that an earlier anthropology tended to ignore…Through the glass of rhetoric we can see that, in any moment of interaction, some act to persuade, others are the target of persuasion some work, other are worked upon. The eventfulness of life. The historicity is moved by the rhetorical will…of those who for a moment hold the floor and aim to realize a plan or intention through, and upon, others (Royal Anthropological Institute (Carrithers 2005:577-583).

The situation we studied involved the introduction of new ways of understanding work and workplace relationships provided by CS LLC and its consultants. We will look at this as an attempt to introduce a new way of understanding workplace relations via language and rhetoric from the field of safety science. This way of understanding the workplace, this new understanding of relationships within the agencies addressed the central issue after Eric's death, the climate of blame. These new understandings attempted to shift attention from the individual's choices and actions to the responsibilities shared by all participants in the process of decision making. In the Minnesota setting, participants overwhelmingly viewed this shift as one away from a "climate of blame" to a more shared, negotiated process of responsibility.

We will treat the new safety science concepts as rhetorically "situated vocabularies". According to C. Wright Mills, "motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited situations" (Mills 1978:302). These "situated vocabularies" are more than specialized terminologies. They incorporate intentionality and help shape meaning.

> They stand for anticipated situations consequences of questioned conduct. Intention of purpose…*is* awareness of anticipated consequence, motives are names for consequential situations, and surrogates for actions leading to them. Behind questions are possible alternative actions with their terminal consequences (Mills 1978:302).

These situated vocabularies function rhetorically, in Kenneth Burke's sense, that language does not merely direct attention, but does so in a "persuasive" manner, i.e., it suggests the nature of the situation and hence outlines appropriate courses of action (Burke 1966:45). Burke suggests that:

> Language be viewed, not directly in terms of a word-thing relationship, but round about, by thinking of speech as the entitling of complex nonverbal situations somewhat as the title of a novel does not really name only one object, but sums up the vast complexity of elements that compose the novel, giving it its character, essence, or general drift (Burke 1966:361)

We argue that safety science concepts and activities have such a rhetorical function. In the Minnesota agencies the activities they have introduced (second story, systems mapping and organizational learning) have provided an opportunity for staff to re-think issues of blame and individual responsibility. In part this re-thinking comes from seeing work and workplace processes more systemically and so more scientifically than they were previously seen. These concepts worked to shift the notion of action in the workplace from the sole responsibility of one person to a process emerging from a shared sense of responsibility.

We will also look at how these new activities and understandings impacted the view of the workplace as an organization. At the introduction of the CS LLC model, workplace relations were typically framed as a hierarchically based organization. For the people we interviewed and surveyed this was a taken-for-granted reality and, to a certain extent, it is still taken for granted. It was and is seen as the most rational way of organizing work since Weber, i.e., the most efficient way (if not the only way) of getting things done and meeting organizational goals. However, this way of understanding work provides the principal foundation for the climate of blame.

In a hierarchical view of social organization, things get done when there is one person in charge of organizing the work of others. Things get done right when an employee follows orders and policy, thus making the correct choices. Things go wrong when direct orders, policies, regulations and even laws and statutes are not correctly followed. These are the understandings of workplace relations at the Minnesota agencies when CS LLC and their consultants entered.

The model introduced by Collaborative Safety and the field of safety science tries to bring new answers to the question: "What's going on here?" In particular, CS LLC introduced new understandings and activities that attempt to "flatten" hierarchy. It re-envisions the autonomous actor's decisions as embedded in a system of organizational decisions. These decisions must be investigated by examining why the various decision makers took each individual step, i.e., the CS LLC concepts of second story and mapping. The second story and mapping activities helped to open up the relationship between the system and individual choices. Instead of emphasizing only autonomous decision making, decisions are seen as cumulative events that reflect the choices of all those involved at each step of a workplace process. CS LLC also framed workplace decision making as a process that should be supported by "scientific" data.

In Minnesota, Eric's death resulted from a climate of blame based on the vertical nature of decisions and the rules, statutes and policies created by those in authority. System, at best, was a case of following the rules (made by those in authority) that pre-defined the actor's choice. CS LLC introduced a model that incorporated science and system as compelling alternatives. Our analysis will examine the introduction of these new understandings during their initial implementation into parts of the Minnesota social service agencies. We will argue that the way CS LLC has attempted to reframe the Minnesota workplaces has had some success. The new CS LLC understandings allowed staff to see accidents like Eric's as something that is tragic but not always caused by the bad choices of specific individuals.

Safety Science

Safety science has deep roots given the role industry and labor has had in the development of Western society. In parallel to this, from the nineteen century on, many nations have implemented industrial safety laws and established regulatory agencies like the USA's OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) to help insure workplace safety.

Along the way, safety science has extended its notion of responsibility to something more than individual culpability. Still safety science etiology often tends to default to the individual and thus has not yet paid much attention to issues like how safety is constructed, maintained and reproduced socially. From an outsider's point of view, today most safety science is still concerned with tracing out individual genealogies of failure in much the same way epidemiologists think about contact tracing in public health. For example, even Dekker's argument that science safety has to move from first stories (narrative) which are typically stories of individual blame to the second stories where the narrative of blame is seen instead as context dependent and constructed has not gained much traction (Dekker 2011).

Safety science believes itself to be an empirical discipline. Things like cultural values and beliefs are seen as ephemeral and therefore unimportant when it comes to understanding accidents and tragedies. In safety science, it is this appeal to empiricism still the autonomous acts and choices that seem to count because their actions comprise the "empirical facts." These individual acts are their primary focus of what even makes up systems themselves.

This credibility emerges from the notion of an empirical science that is not swayed by human beliefs and emotions. Credibility also emerges from the notion of system. System is a logical concept that reduces the impact of (messy) individual decision making. Understanding the workplace as a chain of related activities (i.e., A leads to B which leads to C and so on) again removes the actor's choices from the realm of messy value-laden choices. These claims support the work of safety science and validate its appeal based on objectivity. In other words, the field of safety science is still certain that those involved can propose and measure successfully any safety interventions proposed.

Collaborative Safety, LLC

Collaborative Safety (CS LLC) is a for-profit company that provides advice based on safety science for human service institutions in the U.S.. The CS LLC model initially emerged from the study of critical incidents in high-risk industries like aeronautics, healthcare, the military and the nuclear power industry. This model from safety science stresses the role "the system" has in decision-making in industries like these. This safety model starts from the assumption that in high-risk organizations, rarely or never, is any one employee empowered (enough) to make a critical decision. Tragedy occurs from a cascade of events and only through retrospection can they all be traced back to a single actor.

CS LLC provides clients with a variety of face-to-face meetings, seminars, lectures, and orientations. Those who request it may additionally receive Advanced Practical Training which is essentially a second pass over the concepts and activities that is more directly tailored to advancing safety science principles within learners' own areas of practice. The CS LLC model in Minnesota included several elements. First, there is the implementation and/or review of the state's critical incident review system(s); this is perhaps the most visible artifact of the kind of changes CS LLC attempted to bring to Minnesota's CPS services. Second, child protective services staff of all ranks took part in multiple learning of CS LLC activities. These on- and off-site learning activities exposed staff to the systemic critical incident review process and to the New View of Safety which focuses on systemic learning instead of individual culpability. Third,

on-call support was provided by CS LLC to agency leadership. It is also important to remember that these mappings were group activities. These groups came from care agencies linked in vertical and collateral relationships to each other. Although the administrators we interviewed or surveyed often explained the findings of the groups in terms of their own organization, the understandings that emerged were group products that crossed departmental boundaries.

One of the most important things for the staff trained by CS LLC in the Minnesota agencies was the notion of the "second story". In the terminology of the Collaborative Safety model, the consultants often talk about a first and second story, i.e., narratives to explain critical incidents. The "first story" is the narrative that circulates in the organization immediately after the incident occurs. This is a narrative that tends to center on individual responsibility and culpability. In short, this is a "who did what wrong" story. CS LLC consultants came in initially to work to help staff change the first narrative. Their model enables child welfare staff to build a second story or narrative that expands notions of responsibility and accountability in new directions.

The second story narrative focuses not on who did what wrong but instead looks at systems and structures. These are things that to the staff involved, at least at first blush, do not seem relevant to whatever the incident was. The notion of a cascade of events that impacts systems and structures is seldom part of the staffs' view of work. The second story shifts responsibility from the individual alone to a notion of responsibility that is shared throughout the organization. The second story allows staff to go beyond concerns about the individual(s) involved as surface level "symptoms." Surface level symptoms typically capture the majority of attention. Instead of focusing solely on individual mistakes and policy deviation, the second narrative directs staff to look at systemic factors and how systems impact outcomes.

A second activity/narrative offered by CS LLC is unpacking the first and second story through the critical incident review process. This review is intended to provide data and insight into which aspects of an institution need to change to reduce the number of accidents of all kinds. Part of this review consists of a series of "mappings" that attempt to move from informants' first understanding of what happened when something went wrong to a view that incorporates multiple perspectives and points of view (the second story). In effect, everyone involved in the incident is asked to reflect on what went wrong at the time. People are asked to identify all of the activities that actually happened during/around the incident and why these specific decisions were made. Then these different perspectives are compared and discussed. These mappings allow staff to examine in detail what happened and why various steps were or were not taken.

These activities were presented as and intended to provide the institution with actionable data. In other words, critical incident reviews are framed as providing data that is seen as more than impressionistic and anecdotal. This data is framed as "better" data than that underlying the first story because of the multiple perspectives which it represents. This data is framed as more empirically based data, data that can over-time support institutional change. As both the quantity and quality of data increase, so does the kind of analysis and self-reflection an institution can carry out itself. It is this data that helps an institution move to a more scientific or objective position on what went wrong.

The staff in Minnesota did, in fact, pick up on and appreciate the reframing of the second story as a way to produce "data" as a more rational way to make and support decisions. Perhaps most importantly this production of data became a way, at least to some degree, to escape customary bureaucratic finger-pointing when investigating various kinds of failures or problems in the workplace.

Social Work in the Anthropological Literature

Much of what has been written on social work by anthropologists can be linked to the rise of applied anthropology as a subfield of general anthropology. (The Society for Applied Anthropology was established in 1941). Ruth Benedict's paper (1937) on unemployment in social work may be the first of these publications. Much of what has been published in the anthropological literature related to social work took the form of offering practical advice to the social work community. Most of this was either a discussion of cultural difference or how to build an anthropological perspective into social work training and practice. (For an exception, however, see Henry 1965). There was also some reportage of what social work processes are like outside North America. By the 1980s, attention turned, with many variations on the theme, to the cultural and institutional legitimatization of social work in America. This paper also falls into this category and looks at the effect Eric Dean's death had on state and local staff and their child service organizations. For example, Tina Lee (2015) looks at how, despite *Nicholson v Scoppetta* in the United States, social workers by subscribing to institutional definitions of "domestic violence" and by following agency rules can still justify the placement of children in unsafe foster care situations.

Still there are some practical and analytical issues regarding childcare protection that have not yet received the attention they deserve. One is that those micro-macro interactions related to childcare tend to be too quickly reduced to individual agency or staff problems and those problems are then either glossed over or discussed only as problems of "co-ordination" (Abbot 1995). In other words, the lack of attention paid to issues of hierarchy and power means that the literature tends to focus on case level "adjustments" or negotiation(s).

This can be seen in Lauren Silver's *System Kids: Adolescent Mothers and the Politics of Regulation* (2015), which mainly focuses on the interactions between SILP (Supervised Independent Living Program) mothers and their case managers. Likewise, Lee's 2016 *Catching a Case: Inequality and Fear in New York City's Child Welfare System* (2016) looks at the application of case management "rules" to actual situations, especially those related to placing children in foster care.

The last area relates to the issue of "studying up." There is still a need for a close analysis of the oral and written rhetoric of business and agency leaders (Amernic and Craig 2017). This can provide a window into an organization's culture(s) and its approach to safety (Occasio 2005). Still, the literature has almost ignored the role that the elites and childcare leadership have in setting the day-to-day childcare agenda. Or why "exceptions" like accidents occur in everyday events in the social work world and then can turn into a series of political, cultural and media performances. There is some related work though: Claudia Strauss (2007), for example, discussed the Columbine school shootings.

James Rice and Hanna Sigurjónsdóttir (2018) have looked at what rhetorically constitutes parental responsibility and child protection outside the U.S. in Iceland. Building on Michael Lipsky (1980), the authors argue the issue here is not, as often thought in child protection circles, that neglect is ill defined and so success or failure in child placements cannot be traced directly back to an individual action. The reason that parental responsibility and neglect cannot always be defined in practice is due to the variation of situations in which definitional problems emerge. This is not because definition is in itself impossible but rather that we are always dealing with minor and major variations of meaning in emerging cases of neglect and responsibility. For Rice and Sigurjónsdóttir, definition and actuality seldom coincide because professional judgement allows for and builds on these differences. What this means is that definitions are contingent and are never final. In short, the problem social workers face every day is achieving closure. Rice and Sigurjónsdóttir use the term "discretion" to talk about the (often unacknowledged) differences in ideas about

judgement. This can help explain why multiple agency actions (and mechanisms) may not have the effect someone might want for a child or family.

Gene I. Rochlin (1999) stresses the role of indeterminacy in his work on safe institutions or communities and their ability to learn not to "exclude their own structures and social relations from the discourse." This achievement tends to emerge when an institution takes "no preordained or guaranteed direction" (1999:1552). Further, Rochlin adds that the necessary endpoint for safety learning in an organization or community is the recognition of "the essential indeterminacy of value, identities and knowledge" (1999:1552).

E. Summerson Carr argues that staff workers she studied "neither succumb to horror nor sustain a sense of futility" (2015:264) when faced, for example, with recurrent problems like bedbug infestations in a low-income housing unit. In her case study, after numerous attempts to get rid of the bed bugs failed, staff realized that no single factor, when taken alone, was the solution. Rather this problem, like most problems in social work, are multi-causal, multi-dimensional and non-linear. This realization provides especially fertile grounds to formulate ideas about the nature, limits and possibilities of human agency and responsibility (i.e., blame). In fact, as Carr observes, social work in practice challenges any notion or theory of the sovereign American actor or individual as one who can envision, plan and execute certain ends. This also, Carr argues, means that although staff may think there are "right and wrong' solutions or answers, in practice this is often not the case.

This confirms Carr's argument about agency and bedbugs as being derived from "an understanding of social life as ecological [that] has long characterized American social work" (2015:268). What this means is that, for most social workers enmeshed in human relationships, all situations are complex occurrences and the related elements of an occurrence cannot be easily extracted from the whole.

These ideas can clash badly with the notion of individual culpability. In a bureaucratic organization, informants believe that decisions are made correctly and no mistakes are made when the person making the decision follows policy (i.e., the rules). People at higher levels of authority are legitimately seen as having the right to assign blame if they judge someone at a lower level of authority has not followed the rules. This emphasis on the rules and the individual following the rules resulted in the climate of blame that paralyzed the Minnesota social service agencies after the death of Eric Dean. We will examine the extent to which and how CS LLC activities were used by some upper- and mid-level administrators to attempt to change this climate of blame.

Methods

Site Description: The Minnesota Child Protective Service

Minnesota's child protective service (CPS) system consists of a web of private, public and tribal agencies. When we use the term "Minnesota agencies" we are referring to a number of organizations ranging through the local, county and state levels that constitutes Minnesota's child protective service. These organizations range from "providers" or front-line organizations working with actual recipients to those responsible for ensuring that front-line organizations run according to the various laws and regulations. These various and often quite different agencies are coordinated by the state's Department of Human Services (DHS). Those interviewed held CPS leadership positions at DHS or one of the agencies that co-operates with DHS.

As we will discuss below our informants were upper- and middle-level administrators. They were responsible for ensuring that the many laws, rules and polices that structure the child care workplace(s) were being followed. Work in the various agencies was highly structured and rule-bound, often by governmental groups outside of the agency, like the

state legislature. Rules and laws passed by the legislature were considered by the administrators as difficult if not impossible to change. They also set barriers and boundaries that CPS staff had to oversee and live by. Beyond the legislature were the media and various interest groups that could and did impact CPS work. Some of these groups, particularly the media, could influence the public perception of their day-to-day work.

Data Collection

The study used a qualitative research design of in-depth interviews and thematic analyses of data. Over two days in March, 2019 (with one subsequent phone interview), 19 state and county child welfare managers, supervisors and directors were queried about the CS LLC model, their experiences negative and positive with it, and what the CS LLC model brought to their organizations. They were also asked to identify the most important challenge the CS LLC model posed for their staff and organizations. Of particular interest was how these managers reframed critical incidents to reflect CS LLC "talk."

As for data analysis, the saturation principle was used, and informants were interviewed as long as new phenomena was recorded and appeared in the data. All the managers agreed to participate in the study and, before their interviews, each participant signed a consent form. The interviews were documented initially by hand-written notes and audio recordings, then transcribed verbatim. The Minnesota Department of Human Services at the time of this study had no formal IRB process in place. This is still apparently the norm for state departments like these (see Mallon 2019). The study's informants were contacted by email and telephone, agreed to participate and each signed an informed consent before they were interviewed. Further while it is not entirely possible to mask locale and historical events, no real names have been used here and all work positions, with one exception, have been assigned randomly.

After the interviews, terms like "social work," "child death," and "reorganization" (for example) were used to search academic data bases such as Alexander Street's Anthropological Fieldwork Online, AnthroSource, and JSTOR. For quality assurance, some journals like American Anthropologist, Human Organization, and Practicing Anthropology were searched individually. Article and book bibliographies were also consulted for relevant sources.

Study Limitations

The limitations of this small, pilot qualitative research study need to be discussed. First, this research was paid for by CS LLC to assess the impact of its work with one of the largest social work agencies it works with. This is a formative assessment. Its purpose is to provide input to CS LLC as it attempts to change workplace relationships. We assess how the workplace was understood when CS LLC introduced its new set of frameworks, the changes it attempted to make and, at this early stage, how some of those attempts are being understood by staff. Again, we stress this is early in the process and, as we reiterate below, the number we interviewed was small.

First, the number of informants and interviews were limited. Second, the informants themselves represent just one "slice" of the organizations and systems they are part of, that is, the supervisory level. However, like front-line staff, these administrators could (and were) held individually responsible for problematic actions based on their employees' decisions. Third, the interviewees were chosen because (in part) they were the ones who had the most exposure to Collaborative Safety ideas. Having said all this, it is striking the extent to which they saw CS LLC as providing a legitimate rhetoric to explain what happens when tragedy strikes a child protection organization.

Entering the Workplace: The Climate of Blame

When CS LLC began its work with the Minnesota agencies, the workplaces were in crisis. A mistake had been made that resulted in a child's death. CS LLC was brought in not to calm fears but as a step toward ensuring that critical failures (mistakes resulting in death or injury) never happened again. We will begin by describing how our informants saw the workplace after Eric's death. Certain aspects of this framing are so powerful they had paralyzed the staff. Not only were staff afraid of "critical failures" they were beginning to see many smaller incorrect choices as potential sources of critical failures.

When we began our interviewing with upper- and middle-level administrators at the Minnesota's child protective service agencies the overwhelming atmosphere was still one of fear. Child protection professionals described never experiencing anything like this climate of fear before in their agencies. One administrator described the situation prior to the introduction of the CS LLC model and its subsequent changes in workplace frameworks:

> For as long as I've worked for this company that has…just been how we've operated. Somebody does something wrong and…it must be solely their fault. Like that is the approach we've taken and so this [Collaborative Safety] has been really, really great for us in our team, at all different levels, to step back and go, 'Wait a second'…It can't solely be those 20 people… like individually being accountable for that mistake. Like there's something bigger here, you know, that we need to be responsible for and take action for. It's been really great in that way for us to kind of shift our thinking.

According to the directors and administrators after a tragedy like a child death, agency staff fell victims to a "climate of blame." In the case of the Minnesota agencies finger-pointing and accusations of responsibly (i.e., blame) seemed to be the most common response. One of the administrators we interviewed talked about the impact of newspaper headlines on her work with some long-term care facilities (front-line providers) when the Minnesota Health Department accused those facilities of failure to correctly use face masks:

> We're all [together] in Minnesota. Right! So, oh my gosh…we have seen this over and over again. The very first thing that [the] Department of Health did was come to the office [and] point their fingers at all of us. 'You weren't masked' and 'you didn't have face shields' and I'm like 'no, we didn't because that wasn't required before this'…The articles in the paper blaming long term care, blaming nursing homes…Your mind gets turned on to looking at things differently when you see it right in the headlines. They clearly blame the provider any opportunity.

Newspaper and media exposés led to finger-pointing between departments that fractured the idea of inter-agency shared purposes and shared standards of care. All of this created more potential for blame. Where does this climate of blame come from? We believe that it emerged from many of the assumptions made by our informants about society, personnel, and how groups of people work together.

This initial reaction to a failure in the CPS workplace was of course supported by the hierarchical nature of (bureaucratic) organizations. For our informants, hierarchy itself was not a problem. Someone needs to be in charge and oversee, staff believe, the implementation of all those rules and regulations created by the legislature and the organizations themselves. The problem was the direction of accountability. All of our informants believed that accountability meant finding the person down the ladder of command who committed the error and caused the failure. As one administrator said:

The notion of accountability upward is not part of who we are. We have accountability. What's collateral accountability that goes down but not necessarily up. And that's an organizational structure, organizational value that has to change in order for CS LLC to be successful and to be widespread.

For many employees (including those at all levels like administrators, upper- and middle-level as well as front line staff) blame runs one way. At the Minnesota agencies we looked at, this was a taken-for-granted, an everyday fact of work life.

One source of the fear that terrorized these workplaces after Eric's death is explored here. In Western culture(s), especially the U.S., the rhetoric of individualism is inescapable (Dumont 1992). By individualism we refer to belief in the independent, autonomous being is responsible for agency and action. In the workplace our first thought is that action emerges from the decision-maker's choice. If something goes wrong, someone made the wrong choice while doing his or her job. This belief reflects the central role that the individual plays in social life (Varenne 1978). As the administrator quoted above said, for as long as she had worked for the company, if something went wrong, there must be someone down the ladder who made a mistake.

Accountability up is not a typical characteristic of most bureaucracies nor was it one at Minnesota. We saw this most clearly in the way one administrator framed the response she got when meeting with those in different departments to talk about the CS LLC model. The response she received, the most typical response she noted, focused on finger pointing:

> We talk to different groups…members from the county and from licensing because that's everybody's initial response. 'Yeah, but you know we have to…answer to so and so…You know, they're going to want …to blame somebody.' That's what we've always done.

The response the woman met with was "this is how it's always done. Someone is always looking for someone to blame." This broadly held understanding of what superiors expect of those investigating incidents reflects the taken-for-granted existence of the importance of incorrect individual choices when things go wrong. Whether this unacknowledged understanding exists or whether it is enforced, is not important here. What is important is that so many of the staff seem to believe that it persists so they organize their work practices accordingly. Assuming that poor choices (i.e., not following policy or personal misjudgment) by individuals are the primary causes of failure and blame creates an atmosphere of mistrust for staff. The "old" workplace climate of blame was neither old nor entirely vanquished when we began our work.

Failure happens when someone makes a mistake and staff believe that superiors are always looking for someone lower on the hierarchy to point the finger of blame at. These taken-for-grant assumptions framed the upper- and middle-level administrators' view of the workplace. Not only did these assumptions frame the answer to what went wrong, they also shaped the way investigations were to be handled. The introduction of CS LLC and the ideas from the field of safety science would attempt to provide a different way of framing the issues surrounding failure.

CS Gateway Activities to Achieve Change

Our primary interest in "change" is not in some objective measure of change. The focus here is how staff understand and interpret the various elements of the CS LLC model as they go about their work. The changes we heard about from those we interviewed at the Minnesota agencies at first seemed small. However, some of the basic premises the CS LLC framework were intended to impart to staff were accepted. How staff started to make sense of these premises is our focus here.

Before we start to describe the interpretations, it is important to remember how deeply embedded the climate of blame was and still is in these Minnesota agencies. We saw no evidence that any of the staff we talked to at middle- to upper-administrative levels thought that the basic principles of workplace hierarchy had changed or diminished much. When failures occurred, they believed that accountability came from the top down and someone would be blamed. What differentiated the degree of blame was only the perceived severity of the individual's failure. What the administrators did with the CS LLC ideas was to begin creating new grounds for explaining failures.

We argue that the activities of the second story and mapping gateway activities focused on a retelling of "what happened." These retellings allowed staff to "see" what happened in a far more inclusive way than the "first story" which typically focuses on who did what wrong when. By spending time examining why each actor made certain decisions, new variables, new context and steps in the system emerged. New ways of looking at the systems and processes involved emerged. In short, the CS LLC activities seemed to provide a deeper look into what work and jobs actually entailed. Second stories allowed staff to move from a "primitive" explanation of what happened (i.e., causation) to a more refined, detailed and nuanced analysis.

We can see the search for a "deeper" understanding and for possible "influences" that led to additional factors that might have created a failure:

> In my region at work, we were the first to use the different approach and view in looking at med errors. Our policy is pretty clear cut in, if you get so many med errors in a time frame, you cannot pass meds for a while. We had a staff get a third med error and we dug deeper into the second story about what was going on and the influences that were occurring. We learned that there were several things happening… This is just one example of a factor that was influencing their decisions and actions.

Medication errors had in the past been handled by a policy that suspended a staff member's ability to give out meds if that person had made three pervious errors. We were told that the addition of new workplace polices was a very typical way of handling failures and attempting to reduce errors. This had resulted in an ever-increasing number of polices in the attempt to prevent failures from happening again. CS LLC, this administrator said, provided a different approach. This time, the administrator said, staff had "dug down deeper" and discovered that several "things" were impacting what was happening. Working with CS LLC activities, these administrators did not settle for blaming the individual who delivered the medications but had looked for other factors that impacted the situation.

Another administrator said something similar. The second story also was important because it allowed staff a way to look deeper. One of our survey respondents described this:

> It [CS LLC activities] has helped me to pause and ask for the 'way' behind why we do things. Our work tends to lend itself to creating a lot of policies and procedures. It is helpful to consider whether these are helpful or creating more bureaucracy that hinders productive work.

To ask "why we do things" was a critical step in allowing staff to understand the workplace as a system of processes. The previous knee-jerk response to problems had led to policies that eventually reduced work to merely following the rules, rather than paying much attention to why or why not rules were followed. While this may initially seem a sensible procedure, it is premised on the notion that nothing impacts work other than the individual actor's choice. The CS LLC second story and mapping activities allowed administrators to "look deeper," moving beyond what the actor "actually" did to why s/he did it.

Yet another administrator focused on the CS LLC activities as vehicles that allowed staff to "look deeper" saying, "It has caused our staff to look beyond the immediate elements of an incident to the factors which could have contributed to the background of the incident." These new ways of looking at the workplace allowed staff to see beyond individual acts and to understand the workplace quite differently. This led staff to see that science and the idea of system could help them rethink basic understandings about the workplace.

From Anecdote to Data: The Road to Empiricism
Safety Science is an empirical discipline reflecting taken-for-granted Western ideas about rationality and pragmatism. By this we mean holding beliefs like more data is necessarily better than less and that data collection can be equivalent to scientific work. From the onset, one of the things that staff valued about CS LLC was its emphasis on data and data collection. For example, when asked how CS LLC changed work, one respondent said "[It has] given me back-up data and information to supplement current training materials." Another survey respondent described the changes s/he thought CS LLC had made in her/his work. "I create the agency's online and in-person training curriculum. I have included information and data into monthly and advanced training materials for staff." This kind of data is important because for many staff it may have been the only kind of intellectual resource that could support policy and statute change.

The emphasis on the collection of data and its analysis during critical incident reviews (mappings) was seen as a way of understanding causality (thus responsibility) in a more empirical way. This collection and accumulation of data, often across inter- and intra-institutional boundaries, led to what participants saw as a more scientific explanation of how and why things go wrong. The decisions staff made could shape the lives of the people they cared for; thus it was generally believed that the accumulation of more facts led necessarily to better explanations. Stronger data led to stronger interpretations about what really went wrong in a particular instance. For most of the administrators we saw, this was seen as science or close enough to it.

Much of the appeal of CS LLC data lay in how it was collected. Prior to CS LLC, staff believed that the only thing they had to argue from was anecdotal data. However, this kind of data was not seen as "strong enough" to sustain any argument for change, especially in the face of what they saw as strong constraints on change by policy, regulation and statue. The collection of scientific data played an important role in addressing another common complaint among the administrators: the constant proliferation of policies, rules and statutes. A number of administrators commented that one of the most common management policy responses to the discovery of a problem or failure was to create a new policy in an attempt to prevent it from ever happening again. In response to a questionnaire asking how participation in the Advanced Practical Training (APT) program offered by CS LLC had changed his/her work, an administrator responded: "Hasn't since we have to follow rules and statutes that do not allow for background info to really matter as to why someone made the decision they made." This was reiterated when other administrators were asked to identify any barriers integrating the CS program into their work. As one administrator said: "Rules and statutes dictate what we can and cannot do as far as integrating any changes." Yet another responded to the same question about barriers by saying: "Again, the rules and statutes don't give us much room to integrate this training it seems."

Critical incident reviews and mappings allowed staff to identify less noticed factors again and again. They were not just one-of-a-kind stories relating to individual people or situations. Instead, some factors were regularly and repeatedly identified. For example, one of the administra-

tors explained it this way, "[as we are going through these] mappings and we are identifying these barriers over and over again; we've got some data behind us to show [that] these are the issues that we keep encountering." This discussion continued as follows:

> We anticipate at the end of this year, we're going to have 30 to 60 critical incidents with [their] systemic influences that say yes this one…And that gives us more of an imperative to do something about it, rather than just shelf it.

For this administrator, the combination of moving beyond the anecdotal (i.e., individual cases) and "bringing everyone into the same room to talk about how the system contributed to a critical incident has really opened up, I think, a lot of minds for people." In other words, the CS LLC activity of data collection supported the belief that it could lead to "better" (i.e., higher order) statements about their work. It could also allow them to base their work on something that seems to them like science. As one staff member put it: "How do we create…an approach to investigate and resolve system level issues?" The answer for almost everyone was something like this: Staff needed to "use data from all those mappings and all those critical incident reviews to say what needs to change, you know." Another informant put it this way: "In a positive way [we] are getting at some workplace conditions that might have [been] our blind spots before…and I think [that] is what we're realizing." In other words, CS LLC activities supported the belief that data collection and science could lead to better statements about the way they worked.

This kind of pragmatism (the collection of facts yielding statements valid enough to institute change in the world) makes this epistemological position even more compelling to most Americans. After all, as a staff member reminded us:

> Eventually we can't get there [changing policy] without all learning together and being more educated…and practicing this. We are not going to be able to get to policy until all those things are done.

A scientific base was important not only because it was empirical, but because it was also one of the few resources that could change policy and reduce bureaucratic inertia. This was especially true for staff who believe that in their institutions accountably (i.e., blame) runs only one way – downwards. In effect being able to invoke facts, science and system may be the only way to make arguments strong enough to make change in the world in which they work.

Despite the advances offered by the CS LLC model regarding data collection, staff believed there is still much that needs to be done. As one administrator said, "You know I wouldn't say it's like total system change yet, you know, and getting to the level of policy…I wouldn't say it's systemic or rising to the policy level yet other than [in] individual situations." But another added:

> [All] this helps us to keep moving forward, where I think we've kind of been hamstring a bit by all those things before… [So, people now] have a way to talk about things. How to unpack things, how to look at things as not that one isolating incident.

What the CS LLC model activities provided were alternative and more legitimate ways to make sense of what was really going on in the workplace. As one informant said, "I think [CS LLC] addresses safety and risk in a different way that gives people something to keep moving forward through [all] that complexity."

CS LLC activities were valued because they enabled staff to do empirical data collection that allowed them to understand why problems had happened and how to rectify them in the future. This realization seemed to allow staff, often for the first time, to move beyond their focus on individual actors and actions. Instead they began to see other, underlying factors that impacted why people did the things they did. For staff, this led to a fresh understanding of causation and slowly to the notion of

system itself. As one administrator said, with the CS LLC activities like critical incident reviews and mapping, it became necessary to ask:

> Why did [this failure] happen? Is there something we need to change in our system so, so a bad result doesn't happen again? We want to look at our system and make sure that our systems make sense for people [in them] …That was probably one of my biggest takeaways.

It is this realization, supported by data thus "science" itself, that led staff to ask questions about jobs and the workplace processes not outlined by policy and handbook procedures that actually constrained and informed decisions. In one case, a staff member was being disciplined because he allowed a client to eat too many meatballs at one time. Exploring this incident allowed administrators to move from a view of the staff member's action as cruel or thoughtless, but to see the act as potentially one of kindness. Why had the staff member allowed the over-eating? The staff member believed that the client had so little enjoyment in his life and the client so enjoyed his food, that the staff member had allowed the client to overeat. In this case, the emotions of staff members are a part of "the system" in which social workers participate.

Seeing System for the First Time

System was not an easy concept for the Minnesota social workers to find in their everyday jobs. We are considering the recognition of "system" here as any evidence that staff were moving from a focus on individual responsibility/action as the primary or only agent involved in job performance. There was a shift from understanding context as mere ephemera to context as steps linked together in everyday work practices that constituted work at the job.

Activities introduced by CS LLC were seen as a way to open up the investigation of incidents (i.e., as one supervisor put it these activities allowed one to "pick things apart"). These activities took the focus off individual actors and focused on identifying other factors that influenced staff decisions. What were the actual steps taken by the actor and why did the actor take these particular steps? In short, the very nature of what constituted the job was potentially expanded.

This may seem a small change but it seemed to make a difference to the staff involved. One survey respondent talked about system this way:

> It [CS LLC activities] has shifted my mindset from issues or problems needing to be associated with a specific individual, to understanding that issues or problems can be a systems error where not one person (or any person) has to be responsible.

The job was no longer seen as a simple set of steps and procedures to be followed by any "competent" worker. New variables were discovered and new solutions could be identified to ensure mistakes were not repeated. The CS LLC activities (e.g., mapping, critical incidents, and second story awareness) may be the beginning of some more fundamental reframings. For example, again returning to the issue of med errors, one of the administrators we surveyed described a change that took place in one department when using CS LLC activities:

> [One department] had a practice of taking away med passing privileges after three med errors. Our change in approach has led to systemic changes around med training, med room set up and protocols that take scheduling, cross-training and other factors that present challenges to [staff] when passing meds… Learning all of this showed us the error was less the person's and more from all the circumstances we needed to address.

Here we see a first move away from the attribution of individual error to a recognition of the role of system in work processes.

Recognizing system is difficult at times for the Minnesota social workers. As we have suggested accountability, supervision and control are all believed to be arranged in a hierarchical fashion in Minnesota's agen-

cies. This, we have argued, is the bedrock principle there. The recognition of system has a potential for challenging familiar ways of thinking about work. Indeed, in terms of accountability almost no one we talked to denied the inevitability of downward blame and the search for who did what wrong. One administrator even talked about the potential to fall back into the "old" way of thinking about failure:

> You know, it just takes one incident, one thing in the paper, one call to a county commissioner and people resort to what's comfortable. But now, more and more, I see people having a new way to talk about things. How to unpack things as not one isolated incident.

Another administrator discussed changes in the disciplinary process after her introduction to CS LLC ideas and practices:

> In kind of a subtle, or not so subtle way, when I look at how…in the past, say year or two years we've gone through…things, even things like a disciplinary process or a coaching, its [CS LLC] building on the values that we had, as an organization. So, this [CS LLC] kind of fit in nicely as a context to what we were already applying. But I think it [CS LLC] helped us to start to reach more people who just…as they reflect back and think about a process will make some changes that, ultimately maybe tease apart a decision that gets at what's individual, what more questions do we need to ask, what's more, you know, systemic.

Later this same administrator added that the disciplinary process the agency used was very long and complex to get to the point of firing. CS LLC, she said, has made it clear that it was all the steps along the way that impacted the final result.

Another administrator talked about the impact CS LLC activities had for vertical integration between lead agencies and provider agencies:

> There's been a lot of changes in Minnesota where I think providers, lead agencies and the state sometimes feel like they're at opposite ends and not necessarily on the same side. Bringing everybody into the same room to talk about this, how the system contributed to a critical incident has really opened up, I think, a lot of minds for people. And I think people have been coming away from every single one of our mappings with the idea that, 'Oh my gosh, we are on the same side and I just didn't understand where you were coming from.'

The recognition of system seems to be starting among some of the staff trained in the CS LLC philosophy and activities. It is important to remember that so far only a small number of staff have actually gone through CS LLC training.

Conclusion: Why Do Things Go Wrong?

We began this discussion by pointing out that reality is constantly produced and reproduced by actors embedded in particular cultures. Because they are embedded, this construction is not an idiosyncratic play of imagination but the result of seemingly fixed assumptions actors use to answer the question: "What's going on here?" In the Minnesota CPS agencies after a critical failure, like Eric Dean's death, staff feared that the answer to this question was: "Who caused this terrible failure?"

At the time of Eric's death, and still today, staff knew that the answer to this question would entail a search for the culpable person(s) somewhere down the chain of command, who had made a mistake. The taken-for-granted nature of this idea was accepted by staff based on past experiences and deeply embedded cultural beliefs about hierarchy in the American workplace. The workplace, staff believed, is based on a vertical form of social organization in which those at the top and at various levels of authority throughout the organization give rules, regulations and orders to those charged with (correctly) carrying out those orders.

When critical failures (or serious mistakes) occur, ensuring this behavior is not repeated means finding the person who made the mistake and doing something about it to make sure the mistake is not repeated.

Believing that the workplace is hierarchically organized and that failures result in a search for culpability does not mean that staff believed this actually explained why things went wrong. Indeed, we heard criticisms from staff that the multiplication of policies that circumscribe behavior and just blamed individuals could not explain workplace failures and mistakes.

What Collaborative Safety did was to introduce into the workplace possible alternative ways to explain why things went wrong. What emerged was an organizational arena in which different ideas about the workplace clashed sharply. Only a small number of administrators had actually taken the CS LLC training and tried to pass their learning on. However, they still believed that the search for individual culpability would not end any time soon. Still, a number of the administrators were intrigued by the frameworks CS LLC provided. Given the strength of their belief that the on-going, downward search for culpability would continue to organize their workplace experience, we are impressed by their persistence attempts to reconstruct their understanding of why things go wrong.

Activities like the second story, critical incident reviews and mapping corresponded closely to professional management theories currently circulating in the various Minnesota agencies, like Client Center Management. As social workers and those involved in social work, putting the clients' needs and stories center-stage fit easily into their professional world view. "Knowing" that deeper stories always lurked beneath client behavior may have given activities like second story and mapping strong credibility as sources of "data." Staff saw the collection of more and more data as a more scientific way of understanding why people did the things they did.

Transferring these CS LLC ideas to the workplace may not have been all that difficult. If deeper stories and background context made sense for clients, why not for staff as well? The use of these activities may have opened a new, yet familiar, way of understanding work and why things go wrong. This may have helped further remove the stories from being mere personal accounts and helped made them seem more objective.

These activities also opened another door for the Minnesota administrators, although a little less widely. Working in groups and recounting all the steps involved in work processes (i.e., getting work done) led to at least some recognition of system and the systemic nature of work. When working in group activities like mapping, staff heard from multiple perspectives what different people thought was involved in "getting a job done." Perhaps seeing different elements of a job, from people with different missions and rules, highlighted the processual and systemic nature of their jobs. In any case, at least some administrators began to see jobs not as individual accomplishments, but as complex systems not easily seen or understood from any one individual's perspective.

Interestingly, almost all examples of the system the administrators presented were of the vertical integration of units at different levels of oversight. Much like a layer cake, staff began to talk about their new understanding of how the pressures facing one level of oversight impacted the work they did in their own unit. What might have seemed arbitrary to staff in one unit, became more understandable once another unit's mission and pressures were taken into account.

Did the CS LLC activities create change? From our perspective, the workplace, like all other areas of everyday life, is always in flux. What the CS LLC program did do was to introduce some powerful ideas into the Minnesota agencies. These effects have been limited both by the small number of employees trained and the lack of data collection at all levels of employees working in the agencies. However, the ideas and activities introduced by CS LLC provided new forms of rhetoric for many of the trained staff to answer the question: "What's going on here?" In fact, we can start to see the impact of these new rhetorics on the formal and informal structure in the Minnesota agencies.

The formal structure of the agencies is shaped by laws, rules and regulations for client care. In turn these regulations shape how employees do their jobs and how employee performance is judged. The legitimization of these "rules" are taken for granted by staff. One may, and often does, argue whether the rules are correct or not, needed or not. but one cannot really argue that there should be no formal rules or chain of command. Authority and hierarchy (i.e., the chain of command) are accepted as a fact of life in the American workplace. The introduction of the CS methodology was accepted by the administrators because of its perceived value as a resource for employees to argue for or against the necessity of particular workplace rules. Science, in the form of empirical data collection, provided evidence of an impeachable nature. Avoiding the pitfalls of personal bias, scientific data held the long-term potential to change, drop and add more appropriate "rules" to the workplace and the jobs.

Perhaps the most important element of the informal structure in the Minnesota agencies was the hierarchical nature of work. The climate of blame, the downward direction of accountability (i.e., blame) and the chain of command were taken-for-granted elements of the workplace that no one questioned. Could these elements be unfair? Absolutely. Could they be changed? No one expected that. These structures constituted elements of the workplace that staff had to contend with and maneuver around. We do not believe that CS LLC changed any of these taken-for-granted understandings of the workplace. Rather we believe the CS LLC program with its activities helped staff at the Minnesota agencies believe that change was possible.

We began this paper by pointing out that reality is the byproduct of actors embedded in particular context(s). Although we talk about the role hierarchy plays in these workplaces, and it is substantial, we need to be clear about the dual nature of these informants' jobs. The staff we studied are professional workers. They are aware that their actions (and talk) can deeply impact lives. Further, they hold themselves responsible both at the professional level (i.e., their education and power to make decisions which directly affect others) and the moral level (i.e., their compassion, empathy and human values).

This leads us to another issue. It is widely known but seldom discussed that organizational change projects seldom accomplish many of the goals set out for them. This research suggests that one reason for this is that most organizational change projects seldom "go deep enough," that is, to acknowledge and engage directly with the ethics, values and personal struggles that define the professional workplace. In short, there is often a tendency in applied projects to assume, regardless of the rhetoric, that project success can be equated with some kind of bureaucratic or organizational "adjustment(s)." The problem is these kinds of changes often underestimate the role the issues noted above can play in the successes and failures of any workplace. What this paper illustrates is the need to take into account not just the organizational but the human issues that underlie the achievements of any modern organization. Only when we are better able to acknowledge and address all these issues, will we be able to offer clients better advice than we do now.

CS LLC activities promised to create access to understanding what people did when faced with workplace problems. These activities promised to help sort out what steps should have been taken and perhaps a way to ensure that appropriate steps could be taken in the future. These activities opened up the very idea of the job and did so in a way that was both familiar and acceptable from a human services point of view.

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COMMENTARY:

THE CRAZY MAN

GEORGE NICHOLAS

ABSTRACT

An encounter on a bus between two men prompts reflection on "the anthropological gaze," questioning who is "normal," who is the "other." In ethnographic fashion I describe what I observed, and my reflections on it soon after and then decades later. This narrative raises questions about the ethics of observation and interpretation in public spaces, and asks us to consider how we make sense of who and what we see around us in ways that are respectful but insightful.

KEY WORDS: ethnographic gaze, the Other, ethics, critical self-reflection, cultural diversity

On the Bus

There is a crazy man on the bus. A slightly disheveled, wild-eyed man who watches everyone closely….

On this early autumn day, a man sitting in front of me immediately catches my attention. He has claimed the side-facing bench seat immediately behind the driver. No one sits next to him or across the aisle. My seat is near the middle of the bus and I watch him between his furtive and not-so-furtive glances back toward the passengers. I think that perhaps some people take the bus because, like me (then a young anthropology Ph.D. student), they enjoy watching people in proto-ethnographic fashion —and yet may be uncomfortable when they find themselves also being watched. It makes no difference in this case as there is no way to avoid observing this man.

He sits stiffly, with his back wedged into the corner formed by the side window of the bus and the driver's partition. He seems wary of everyone. Is it because he feels exposed in that position, with all of the passengers facing him? Or perhaps, I think, he belongs to a society whose members must keep their personage protected from the gaze of others, in the same way that some keep hidden their true names or cover their mouth while eating. The man accomplishes this task effectively by staring intensively at everyone nearby. His stare works well — although I am keen to watch him, I find him difficult to observe.

He is a composite of a dozen characters I have seen or heard of or read about in as many places, books, and films. He would not be out of place in a logging camp in northern Maine, or in a service station in rural Missouri, or outside the student union at my university — all places I've frequented. And all the while watching him, I consider what would happen if an ethnographer chose this individual to interview from among his fellow bus passengers. Would he fall within or outside the range of variation? How representative of the larger population is anyone on this bus? Is it simply a matter of sample size?

He wears a slightly worn blue nylon quilted jacket, the type that I recall my grade-school bus-driver wearing. On his head is a corduroy hat with earflaps that are folded up. Even though it is a warm September day, I reason that if he is going to wear such a hat, the flaps should be down; he should not wear it so half-heartedly (recalling the protagonist of John Kennedy Toole's novel, A Confederacy of Dunces). He wears a blue oxford shirt, barely visible beneath his jacket. His pants are gray, of indiscernible material and style. He has a gold-faced watch on his left wrist. When everyone

leans while the bus turns a corner, I can see that he wears new blue running shoes (top brand) and not the boots I half expected. While his clothes are not unusual in themselves, the array somehow seems noticeable even within the eclectic fashions of a university town.

Occasionally he reaches for the safety bar next to him, but never when the bus turns a corner. He looks about sharply, as if to catch someone looking at him, then rubs his face/mouth/nose and adjusts his cap all in one smooth motion (similar to a professional pitcher in a baseball game), and then glances around again. This practiced routine suggests that he may be trying to hide one of these actions amongst the others, but I cannot tell which one it could be. His sideburns are long and bushy and reach the line of his jaw. He has a week's growth of beard, and possibly a mustache.

He often looks at his watch. And then, after staring at it intently, pulls out a blue-bordered booklet from his pocket. It may be a bus schedule, but it could also be a farmer's almanac, a treasure map, the results of an electron decay experiment, a sheaf of poems, a collection of recipes, a table of random numbers, or a list of his own ethnographic observations. He opens it with great flourish and busies himself in studying it intensely, holding it only inches from his face — has his misplaced his glasses, I wonder? Once I watch him move his head about as though he is watching a fly encircle his head. Each time he goes through these motions — adjusting his hat or examining his booklet or watching something — he looks quickly about to check whether anyone has seen him. Several times he catches someone off-guard and flashes what might be a look of triumph. He doesn't catch me.

We both get off at the same stop; he exits from the front of the bus while I leave by the rear door. I wonder where he will go, but he remains at the bus stop. Moving reluctantly on, I sneak glances back at him by watching his reflection in the shop windows, and once by stopping to tie my shoelace. The last time I see him clearly, he is standing off of the sidewalk, facing traffic, and bending down to pick up something from the road.

The Briefcase

After we both exit the bus, I see that the man carried a gray sports coat I hadn't noticed earlier and had an imitation leather briefcase at his side. I laugh to myself at the wild notion to somehow get hold of that case. As a student of material culture, the basis of archaeological study, I reckon that it might hold the answers to my

many questions. But I quickly realized that any attempt to grab the case would be madness on my part.

His briefcase, were I to have opened it … would it have been filled with his version, of whatever form, of what was in mine (a ragged-handled canvas L.L. Bean tote bag) at the time: an issue of the journal American Antiquity; an article about the unanticipated consequences of an anthropologist's gift of an ox to Kalahari hunter-gatherers; an article on Coyote and Native American Tricksters; a draft manuscript of mine entitled "The Yanomami in the Classroom;" a battered field book of my previous summer's excavation notes; a bagel and three tea bags; a handful of paper clips; a broken pencil; a replica of a stone-bladed knife with handle and a plastic Paleolithic Venus figurine I had used in class that day; three letters; a Talking Heads postcard; a horse chestnut; a box of computer disks; and a Playmobil figure that my son placed into the bag while I was not looking. How would that man interpret this sample? As the material culture of an academic? Or perhaps as that of someone socially marginal? Would he wonder what I did with these things, these talismans? Has he watched me before, notebook in hand? Has he written a story about me?

There was one moment, near the end of our ride together, when our eyes met and held for several seconds. I was startled, for he looked at me with the eyes of an inquisitive scientist. I adjusted my shirt collar and pretended to look away, but I recognized that look as one of longing for understanding — and I believed in that moment, if only for that moment, that we were colleagues.

On Reflection

As a graduate student, I sometimes took the bus that runs from outlying town where I lived to the university. I passed the time by watching my fellow passengers, satisfying a life-long urge to observe people, cultivated by the lingering extreme shyness of my childhood.

I was then, and am now, an archaeologist. My world is one of the past. I am also an anthropologist investigating cultural diversity, only my informants are millennia gone. So I examine what they left behind, their material culture, to answer questions about human behavior, motivation, and relationships. That interest extends to contemporary societies. In the decades that followed the encounter on the bus, my work would soon extend to working with and for Indigenous peoples worldwide in aid of studying and protecting their heritage on their own terms. In doing so, I would often find myself in situations where I was clearly an outsider, the Other, sometimes initially seen as someone with suspect, if not odd, motivations and interests.

Why has my memory of the man on the bus become indelible? I would recognize him today without hesitation. I could identify him instantly — as perhaps he could me. Do I remember him so well because of his unusual character? Or is it because any attempt at analysis of what I observed requires a memorable degree of self-reflection? What then does turning the mirror on myself reveal of my own unusual character?

That encounter, and especially my writing of it, also raises questions about the ethnographic gaze and the ethics of observation in public spaces, namely who has the right to observe, to interpret? I am acutely aware of the ethics of observation and interpretation, especially in situations where those we observe may be considered marginalized. In the context of working with descendant communities — in my case Indigenous ones — I engage frequently with the ethical questions and concerns that arise in the context of repatriation, research ethics and consent, scientific colonialism and the power imbalance that is its legacy, and the question of who controls, who benefits from heritage research done by outsiders.

My encounter with the man was not linked to a research project or a class exercise, but simply part of my personal observation of the world and the opportunity it provided to reflect on and share what I observed

and learned. Isn't this something that is at the core of anthropology — to seek ways to better understand others as well as ourselves? Is this what David Byrne refers to in his song "Social Studies," as he explores ways to connect and to understand others: "… When shopping at the supermarket I felt a great desire to walk off with someone else's groceries / So that I could study them at length / And study their effects on me / As though if I ate their groceries I would become that person; until I finished their groceries … (from *Music for The Knee Plays*, 1985).

In recounting this story, a colleague asks what would have happened if I had spoken to the man. Might that inconceivable action by me have revealed "similar hopes, fears, triumphs and failures we all have, despite his cultural otherness"?

In the years since my last encounter with him, I still find myself asking, "How crazy was he, if I, the archaeologist, am the one who studies people whom I cannot see, cannot talk to, cannot hear, touch, or smell? I excavate their belongings, I reconstruct their lives, but I will never meet them face to face. They can live only in my own mind. How different are the two of us?" Is it for that reason that, both then and today, I continue to find myself attracted to his actions, fascinated by his agency, and respectful of him as a person.

In the end, I suppose, we are all disheveled and wild-eyed crazy men and women. Each of us carries a briefcase (or backpack, rucksack, basket, medicine pouch) filled with our most immediately necessary belongings. Each of our stories are different. Those who observe us may never know how we started out, who we are now, or how we make sense of the world around us, until they happen to share a path with us, intentionally or accidentally. Our worlds remain separate, but occasionally we touch. And in those brief moments, we might each become the other and see the world anew.

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COMMENTARY:
AN APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGIST
JODY GLITTENBERG

ABSTRACT

Some two decades ago the Department of Anthropology at the University of Colorado – Boulder celebrated fifty years since its founding. Faculty spoke about special events that had occurred. Professor Robert Hackenberg named four former doctoral students during these years whom he stated had gone on to do exemplary work in the applied field.[1] I was one. This commentary covers events and activities that shaped my becoming an applied anthropologist.

KEY WORDS: applied anthropology, public health, transcultural nursing, Guatemala, the border

A Public Health Nurse

I was totally surprised to be named an exemplary applied anthropologist by Professor Robert Hackenberg at the University of Colorado – Boulder commemorative event on behalf of the Department of Anthropology's 50th anniversary. I had been a "late comer" to anthropology. Hackenberg was an astonishing applied anthropologist himself, so I was assured he'd given thought to this list. As an awardee I was asked to write about my applied work. These are a few events and activities that shaped my becoming an applied anthropologist.

I believe that my chosen field in nursing, public health, was a natural bridge to my actions as an applied anthropologist. In public health you work naturally with a broad spectrum of cultures, many times speaking foreign languages. The goal of public health is to empower people to use their own resources to solve their problems. This was evident in my last research project: a natural study of violence called the CEPP Community Empowerment Partnership Project.

I began my nursing career in 1953 in Colorado Springs. A principle in public health is to live with the people you are serving. My first assignment was in a high crime, poor district. As I'd just graduated from nursing school, I needed to find a low-cost apartment. I found a decent, clean one in my district for only $15 a month. It had a tiny bedroom and a tinier kitchen with no running water. And, I had to share a bathroom with four guys. After one full year, I was able to move "up" to a three-room for only $25, but still no running water and only one guy to compete for the bathroom.

Police raids didn't bother me, but domestic violence did. Yelling, screaming, and throwing pots and pans concerned me, but I really was afraid that walls in my bedroom might break. It was before we knew much about domestic violence. I did nothing but was glad the couple moved away. In 1957, my new husband and I moved to Boulder. There at the University of Colorado, I completed my baccalaureate and master's degree as a psychiatric nurse clinical specialist.

John Kennedy's *Action for Mental Health* created a monumental shift from institutional housing of mentally ill people to returning them to their home communities. The Colorado State Hospital in Pueblo purged their wards of 8,000 ill people with the hope that Thorazine and home care would eliminate mental illness. It did not. Instead, it created another problem: homeless mentally ill people. During that chaotic time, I co-authored *Out of Uniform and into Trouble*. This popular book would define my role, for many decades, as a World

Health Organization consultant to countries including Australia, the Peoples' Republic of China, and Papua New Guinea. I helped nurses broaden their therapeutic skills and responsibilities.

Before starting my doctoral studies, I was a stay-at-home mom with two children and a piano studio. These were sacred years that I treasure.

Ph.D. in Nursing

During World War II some nurses were officers in the Armed Forces, so when the war was over many of them took advantage of the GI Bill to gain further education. Some leaders began to visualize nurses as equal to physicians and dentists. Thus began the goal of establishing the Ph.D. in nursing that would lead to preparation of a nurse as a Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP). The Institute of Nursing Research (INR) was established to support nursing research. The new Ph.D. degree would synthesize knowledge from five related fields: anthropology, human systems, physiology, psychology, and sociology. Therefore each faculty member, in order to teach at the doctoral level, needed to have a Ph.D. in one or more of these five related fields.

My Doctoral Studies

Being born into a tri-ethnic family (English, German, Danish), learning about diverse cultures always interested me. I began doctoral work in 1970 and finished in 1976, a period that included the summation of studies – a year of fieldwork. That year was to be spent in an unfamiliar culture to learn rules on how to live for a one-year cycle. My doctoral studies therefore took me 5 ½ years, all financially supported by the National Institutes of Health on an individual scholarship.

I had a chance to begin "fieldwork" my first summer of study. A Lutheran medical missionary, Dr. Carroll Behrhorst, ran an indigenous hospital in Guatemala. The doctor pleaded, "I need help". Five of us nurses planned volunteering for six weeks at a time, thus giving the doctor 30 weeks of help. I was the fifth, the last. However, I received a letter from number four, saying, "You are not to come as Doc doesn't want any more 'putting up crosses and giving away bibles'." I wrote a quick letter asking if I could please come: "I'm different." He wrote back, "You may come but you're not welcome." I went and kept quiet and loved the people. That volunteer work led to my doctoral field study of one year in two Highland Guatemalan towns: a

Latino and an Indian where I compared fertility rates. Doc and I eventually became lifelong friends. It also led to my five-year NSF Study of Recovery from the 1976 Earthquake.

Madeleine Leininger

My mentor and friend, Madeleine Leininger, wrote *Nursing and Anthropology: Two Worlds* Blend in 1970. Her theory of transcultural nursing became the lynch pin that spread to the whole health care system. Through her leadership she founded two scholarly societies: the Transcultural Nursing Society (TNS) and the Council on Nursing and Anthropology (CONAA). TNS has an international membership. Both have annual conferences and refereed journals. I was a Board Member in TNS and was President of CONAA for four years. CONAA is an affiliate of SfAA.

Shaping Me as an Anthropologist

We have no idea how life will change. You just to have faith and put one foot in front of the other and go. One such event happened just after receiving my Ph.D. I received a telephone call from Vera Rubin, Director of the Research Institute for the Study of Man. She said, "You were identified as one as of the new thinkers, I want to meet you." I flew to New York, stayed at the Waldorf Astoria, and met Vera and two other female invitees: Mary Elmendorf and Joyce Jordan and seven males. Vera told me that I sat in the chair that Margaret Mead had sat in the hour before. The next two days we shared visions for the future of anthropology. Vera supported me throughout my career.

Another surprise was when I received a handwritten note from Marvin Harris, a key anthropology theorist and leader. "Your doctoral research is outstanding, and the way anthropology is supposed to be done." The resulting book, *To The Mountain and Back* (my dissertation), is still selling through Waveland Press and Amazon. Students and others have expressed their appreciation for it.

I still treasure the book I co-authored with Peter Van Arsdale. We sat on campus steps one evening thinking of a new direction for medical anthropology. We both were cultural anthropologists, so we needed a biological perspective. The perfect person was right there at the University of Colorado -- Lorna Moore, a biological anthropologist. She added so much. Robert Aldrich, a nationally-known pediatrician, provided scientific aspects of human development. (Jonas Salk, renowned polio vaccine pioneer, wrote the foreword.) The four of us met weekly in Bob's office, sharing the writing we had done. A book emerged in 1980, *The Biocultural Basis of Health: Expanding Views of Medical Anthropology.* Our view of medical anthropology moved away from the interesting, but limited way of only studying esoteric features of indigenous healers. Our book provided a broader, ecological view of health. It examined biological issues linked with cultural behaviors such as diabetes and eating practices. We updated the book in 1987 and published it with Waveland Press. It won the annual Book of the Year Award from *The American Journal of Nursing*.

Synopses of Two Research Studies

Funds I helped obtain from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) brought my colleges indirect costs of about $8.8 million dollars over several years. I used mixed methods in the studies that emerged, always starting with ethnography to set parameters for data collection. Also, I used this approach for the interpretation of findings. As I had as a public health nurse, I continued to live with the people being studied.

The Quasi-Experimental and Longitudinal Study of Recovery from the 1976 Guatemalan Earthquake: A 7.8 magnitude earthquake on February 4, 1976, shattered Guatemala. I flew down immediately. The day after I arrived, I joined a dozen men to deliver a truckload of donations to

Tecpan, a Highland town. The road we took clung to cliffs. It was a treacherous journey as the roads were barely visible. We finally arrived, but there was no town; everything had already been bulldozed. I said, "Take the truck to Zaragoza." I had lived in that Ladino town for a year doing my dissertation research. It was dark as we entered. Someone soon found a flood light. Hundreds of people, my neighbors, were crying, "We knew you'd come." Their stories about the *terremoto* were so painful to hear. The Ladino in the Highlands were disliked, so no relief agency was assigned to give them any donations.

The next morning, I went to the Instituto de Centro America y Panama (INCAP). Most of the buildings were down, but I could see a young man sitting in an open window. I approached and asked him how he was doing. We talked more, he established his credentials, and I asked, "What do you think of doing research on the recovery of the country?" He answered in the affirmative.

Within weeks a proposal was written and funded for a five-year study. Fred Bates, a sociologist from the University of Georgia, was Principal Investigator. Tim Farrell, an anthropologist affiliated with IN-CAP, and I were co-Principal Investigators. Tim was the man I'd met at the INCAP open window. The Institute became the headquarters for the study.

I focused on recovery of four urban squatter and one control settlements. Over 200,000 urban dwellings had been destroyed. Some survivors simply squatted on vacant land. Because they were similar in size and had received outside aid, these settlements became the research sites. The control settlement, La Limonada, was seemingly unseen, dug deeply into the center of the city. It had received no relief. Daily I spent time in one or more of the four settlements. The NSF household questionnaire was used in each settlement. In 1988 I hired a driver who took me to each location.

Each squatter settlement contained approximately 10,000 people. In Carolingia citizens voted to rebuild on the hillside where they found safety. Men worked in the distant city, while women dug trenches and foundations. In my visit in 1988, the place looked like a vital town; it even had two factories. This was a successful resolution.

In two other squatter settlements, Roosevelt and 4th of February, each family received land and a simple stucco house with a 10-year mortgage of $1,400. The 4th of February locale was always a feisty settlement with residents living on the edge of legality. They expressed no fear but rebuilt their houses and markets within weeks.

Roosevelt settlement was always filled with more timid people. But, in 1988 both settlements had built roads, schools, and had two-storied houses.

Chinautla, the fourth research site, started out as the other three, but a drastic event occurred as all their houses were gobbled up by a river that had changed direction. In the past it was one of the oldest communities in the city. Residents had a reputation as designers of beautiful clay figurines. By comparison, Nuevo Chinautla, built on solid, flat land was basically unoccupied in 1988. The people had no clay.

La Limonada was the control site. It was "off the charts" to be studied at all. But quasi-experimental research must have a control. La Limonada was it. I'd planned my trek into the depths of hell very carefully. Go alone in broad daylight. Carry nothing, but in one hand conceal pepper spray. Go around noon on Sunday as men will be at a soccer game. Identify yourself as Doctora (which was true), looking for the nurse (they would only have an injectionist). Look them straight in the eye, and smile. It had always worked for me and did again when I descended 1/3 mile down steep steps. I met Ramona (always use the person's name).

Suddenly rocks came from above, a notice. Ramona yelled and waved her hands. I'd passed the safety and trust test. We talked for over a half hour about the earthquake and what it had done to their

community. "Not much. Our houses shook down and pots flew around, clothes and stuff, but no one was hurt or killed. Nobody gave us nothing, but we got drinks and blankets on the streets. We got more than we ever had," she laughed. As I started up the steep steps I met young kids carrying plastic jugs filled with water. It reminded me of my public health nurse days in my cheap apartment without water.

The control group did just as the research squatters had done. They used their wits and worked at regaining what they had.

One premise of the study was that after a natural disaster, change happens. It did. About four years into the research, a revolution began. At noon one day, armed rebels kidnapped the director of INCAP. I was living in the Wycliffe's walled compound. Fred Bates drove up and yelled, "I got word that all foreigners are to leave … right now, don't pack anything … just go!" I located my VW Beetle, threw in my belongings and data from the squatters, then picked up a female friend from Texas. I yelled, "We should leave by the east side then go along the coast until we enter Vera Cruz. I think it will be safer." It was not. We escaped several near fatal encounters.

Few details of our findings were completed and published. As far as I know only my squatter segment was ever published, in 1989. Because anthropologists often study in dangerous situations, data loss, although devastating, does happen.

A Natural Study of Violence: In the 1990s the Community Empowerment Partnership Project (CEPP) began. Key findings are contained in the 2007 book, Violence and Hope in a U.S. Mexico Border Town.

In the U.S. Southwest the summer of 1994 was called "The Summer of Violence." At an NIH meeting a prospective research group was challenged: "If we only could find someone who would live in a violent community and study what is going on." I thought, "That's what anthropologists do!" I knew of a small town known to be very violent. I called it Esperanza. It is one square mile in size; 82% of the residents were Hispanic with a long history of informed cultural practices. Over half lived below the poverty line. It was a Border Town. Known for gang fights, drug dealing, and street walkers, the town was filled with rundown houses, graffiti, piles of garbage, and empty beer bottles.

Following the NIH meeting I applied for and received funding from NIDA (National Institute on Drug Abuse). This $750,000 grant plus a Provost grant of $5,000 was spread over four years. Before applying for the grant, I'd gained permission (in writing) from the mayor to do the study, live in a HUD apartment (which became our headquarters), make our presence known, have a desk in the police department, and set up an advisory committee. We promised to do nothing but live as good neighbors. We would attend court, police "ride-alongs," council meetings, and monthly community meetings. Anyone could visit us at the HUD location at any time. A random household survey was conducted during the third year. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was received for everything we did.

The team included a legal anthropologist, a drug investigator, an executive assistant, a family nurse practitioner, and me. We spent days and nights in Esperanza with weekly meetings at the nearby college. Chacon, our executive assistant and her family lived in the HUD apartment for two years. Also, we had three offices at the university, a desk in the police department, and another office in a store front. Over 50 students from three institutions spent time with our team during the project's four years.

The 2007 book details multiple layers of data collection. We had over 8,000 data points. The base provided an overall picture of the town. Demographic data from a census tract, eight focus groups chosen from ethnographic profiles, and life histories made up the data set. We attended church services, fiestas, funerals, and cleanup days. We shopped locally and ate many meals there. Three colleges of nursing did

part of their training with us. Two dissertations were completed.

In this natural study the real underlying cause of violence was poverty. Poverty led to illegal drug dealing by everybody who wanted to get a buck or two. Street walkers got their buck or two from cheap sex in an alley. Public drunkenness was symptomatic of depression. Drugs from the big dealers would link with gangs. The tortilla lady and the kid on the bike were also caught in this cycle. It seemed like everyone was doing it and -- with an underfunded police force with patrol cars that often had dead batteries – things can happen.

Things began to change when the police department received a $100,000 grant to halt domestic violence. (It was the only grant I helped them write, but it taught them a lot.) The town's leaders began to use our findings for additional grants. They began with the federal $250,000 "Weed and Seed" grant to "weed out the bad and seed in the good." The community began to change.

The former mayor had once saved the town from bankruptcy. He still was viewed very positively, a strong man. He was an amazing, powerful figure who gave them hope. Using money from the Weed and Seed grant, action was everywhere: local groups wrote proposals for small projects, like $10,000 to tear down a crack house, plant a garden, or develop a park. At the monthly community meeting, with at least 100 in attendance, food was served. Each local grantee reported their success. Applause was resounding. Each grant was matched, so the final sum reached more than $13.1 million. President Clinton visited Esperanza. He presented the leaders with an award plaque.

The change in appearance of the town was amazing. Houses had new roofs, new doors, new paint; flowerpots were on the streets. A new shopping center replaced an old run down one. The pride of the townspeople was reflected, "We're not afraid to go out at night. The gangs and the street walkers are gone. Police help us; they ride their bikes on the streets and in the alleys."

Conclusion

How do we react as researchers? We know that our coming without "doing" anything would change nothing. It's just the way research works when you bring in new thinking. Will it last? We hope so.

I've used the Chinese motto I saw above Doc Behrhorst's desk in Guatemala:

> Go to the People
> Live with the People
> Start with what they want
> Build on what they know
> Love Them
> When you leave…
> They will say we did it ourselves.

I hope some of my journey's tale was useful. Adios.